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Abstract
This paper evaluates, in the context of economic geography estimates, the mag-
nitude of the distortions arising from the choice of zoning system, which is also
known as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). We consider three standard
economic geography exercises (the analysis of spatial concentration, agglomeration
economies, and trade determinants), using various French zoning systems differen-
tiated according to the size and shape of spatial units, which are the two main de-
terminants of the MAUP. While size matters a little, shape does so much less. Both
dimensions seem to be of secondary importance compared to specification issues.
JEL classification: R12, R23, C10, C43, O18.
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1 Introduction
Most empirical work in economic geography relies on scattered geo-coded data that
are aggregated into discrete spatial units, such as cities or regions. However, the ag-
gregation of spatial dots into boxes of different size and shape is not benign regarding
statistical inference. Up until recently, economists paid little attention to the sensitivity
of statistical results to the choice of a particular zoning system, known as the Modifiable
Areal Unit Problem (henceforth MAUP). Our main objective here is to assess whether
differences in results across empirical studies are really sparked by economic phenom-
ena in the process under scrutiny, or rather just by different zoning systems. We first
investigate whether changes in either the size (equivalently the number) of spatial units,
or their shape (equivalently the drawing of their boundaries) alter any of the estimates
that are usually computed in the economic geography literature. Second, we address
the important question of whether distortions due to the MAUP are large compared to
those resulting from specification changes.
Disentangling these two effects is essential for policy. For instance, much work has
tried to check empirically whether agglomeration enhances economic performance at
the scale of countries, European regions, US states or even smaller spatial units such
as US counties or French employment areas. The size of the resulting estimates differs
between papers, but we do not know whether this reflects zoning systems or real dif-
ferences in the extent of knowledge spillovers, intermediate input linkages, and labor-
pooling effects on firm productivity. The resulting economic policy prescriptions re-
garding cluster-formation strategies will be affected accordingly. In the same vein, a
large body of literature has evaluated the degree of spatial concentration, but does not
check whether the conclusion that some industries are more concentrated than others
results from the chosen zoning system or frommore fundamental differences in the size
of agglomeration and dispersion forces across industries at different spatial scales.
This paper is based on three standard empirical questions in economic geography,
although many others could have been considered.1 We start by evaluating the degree
of spatial concentration under three types of zoning systems: administrative, grid and
partly random spatial units. We then compare the differences between concentration
measures (Gini vs. Ellison and Glaeser) with those between zoning systems. We then
turn to regression analysis. Not only is the measure of any spatial phenomenon likely
to be sensitive to the MAUP, but also its correlation with other variables. We estimate
the impact of employment density on labor productivity and compare the size of ag-
glomeration economies across zoning systems and econometric specifications. Finally,
we run gravity regressions. As trade determinants are highly sensitive to distance, and
are hence a priori more exposed to the MAUP, it is particularly relevant to evaluate the
impact of MAUP relative to mis-specification in this context.
All of the empirical exercises suggest that changing the size of spatial units only
slightly alters economic geography estimates, and changing their shape matters even
less. Both distortions are secondary compared to specification issues.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a simple
1For comparison purposes, we use the same specifications as those typically found in the literature
(see Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008)), even though we do not necessarily think that they are the most
apt.
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illustration of the possible size- and shape-dependency of spatial statistical inference,
along with a brief review of the MAUP literature. Section 3 lists the zoning systems for
which our estimations are carried out. As a first sensitivity test, Section 4 is dedicated
to the study of French spatial-concentration patterns. Sections 5 and 6 investigate the
extent to which changing econometric specifications and zoning systems affect the size
and significance of wage and trade determinants respectively. Section 7 concludes and
suggests further lines of research.
2 The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem: A Quick Tour
The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem is a longstanding issue for geographers. In their
seminal contribution, Gehlke and Biehl (1934) were the first to emphasize that simple
statistics such as correlation coefficients could vary tremendously across zoning sys-
tems. They note that, in the United States, the correlation between male juvenile delin-
quency and the median equivalent monthly housing rent increases monotonically with
the size of spatial units. Openshaw and Taylor (1979) pursued this line of investigation
and, drawing on correlations between the percentage of Republican voters and the per-
centage of the population over sixty, standardize what they called the “Modifiable Areal
Unit Problem”.2
2.1 A simple illustration of the MAUP
Spatial statistics may vary along two dimensions: firstly, the level of aggregation,
or the size of spatial units, and secondly, at a given spatial resolution, the drawing of
their boundaries, or their shape. Figure 1 illustrates these two related issues via the
employment density - labor productivity relationship.
Black points display the location of skilled workers, whose individual productivity
is denoted y, while empty dots stand for unskilled workers, with productivity y < y. In
the top figure, space is divided into four rectangles, each consisting of three skilled and
two unskilled workers. The spatial distribution of workers across units is uniform and
average productivity is the same across units. To illustrate the shape effect, consider the
bottom-left figure. Spatial concentration emerges here, with two clusters of six high-
skilled workers and two clusters of four low-skilled workers. Average productivity is
higher in the former due to the spatial sorting of labor skills. Hence, agglomeration
economies, defined here as the positive correlation between productivity and employ-
ment density, are zero in the first zoning system but positive in the second. We now
turn to the size effect. In the bottom-right figure, we consider smaller rectangles with
the same proportions as in the top figure. Spatial concentration is also found here, but
the relationship between productivity and density is less marked than in the bottom-
left case. Indeed, the difference in productivity between low- and high-productivity
regions remains the same (except for empty boxes), whereas the density gap increases
in the bottom-right case.
The extent and scope of agglomeration economies change with the size and shape of
units, even though the underlying spatial information -the location and productivity of
2See Fotheringham and Wong (1991) for an extended review of the earliest MAUP contributions.
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Figure 1: The size and shape issues
workers- remains the same. Even so, the issue is more subtle than at first sight. While
it is clear that changing the zoning system will likely alter the perception of a particu-
lar phenomenon, the crucial question is whether the measurement errors this induces
are systematic or random. If the former, extreme caution is warranted in interpreting
the results, because systematic errors imply that, for a given zoning system, part of the
underlying process has been omitted from the estimation. Consequently, policy pre-
scriptions from a particular zoning system may not be very informative. In the latter
case, as the economic phenomenon is neither size- nor shape-dependent, the MAUP is
not an issue per se, since most estimation procedures are robust to randommeasurement
errors. This paper aims to disentangle the two effects.
2.2 Related literature
A number of authors have provided detailed analyses of the MAUP. Using simple
univariate statistics, such as the mean and the variance, Amrhein and Reynolds (1996)
and Amrhein and Reynolds (1997) show that size and shape distortions depend on the
aggregation process, and more precisely on whether information is either averaged or
summed, as well as on the spatial organization of raw data, as reflected for instance in its
spatial autocorrelation coefficient. According to Arbia (1989), size and shape distortions
are minimized (although never eliminated) under two restrictive conditions: the exact
equivalence of sub-areas (in terms of size, shape and neighboring structure) and the ab-
sence of spatial auto-correlation. Clear theoretical underpinnings are more difficult to
come by for other statistics such as correlations or regression estimates. Fotheringham
and Wong (1991) consider a multivariate analysis of the determinants of mean house-
hold income for various zoning systems, and come to an alarming conclusion: “The
MAUP [...] is shown to produce highly unreliable results in the multivariate analysis
of data drawn from areal units”. They also find a sizeable range for correlation and
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regression coefficients, which are positively (or negatively) significant for certain data
configurations, but insignificant for others, suggesting that inference is not robust to the
aggregation process.
Amrhein (1995) was the first to suggest separating aggregation effects from other
types of discrepancies, such as model mis-specification. One of his appealing results
is that well-suited models, such as Amrhein and Flowerdew (1992), do not produce
distortive aggregation effects, whereas others, for instance Fotheringham and Wong
(1991), are contaminated by size and shape.
We extend this literature in a number of ways. First of all, we systematically assess
the magnitude of size and shape distortions relative to mis-specification biases. Sec-
ondly, we examine different aggregation processes to test the robustness of economic
inference to the MAUP, since for agglomeration economies, raw information is aver-
aged over spatial units, while for trade flows it is summed. Finally, we extend the work
of Fotheringham andWong (1991) by comparing the estimates from six different admin-
istrative and grid zoning systems to those from a hundred random equivalent zoning
systems.
3 Zoning systems and data
The first zoning system we consider is that composed of 341 continental “Employ-
ment areas” (EA). These spatial units are underpinned by clear economic foundations,
being defined by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (INSEE) so
as to minimize daily cross-boundary commuting, or equivalently to maximize the co-
incidence between residential and working areas. This zoning system was designed
to reduce the statistical artefact due to boundaries, which is why it is widely used in
France. As can be seen on the left-hand side of Figure 2, the average employment area
is fairly small, covering 1,570 km2, which is equivalent to splitting the U.S. continental
territory into over 4,700 units.
Shape distortions can be identified from spatial units that are similar in size (or num-
ber) to differently-shaped employment areas. Conversely, size distortions can be high-
lightedwith partitions of France involving units that are larger than the 341 EAs. Hence,
to disentangle the two faces of the MAUP, we appeal to three other sets of zoning sys-
tems.
3.1 Administrative zoning systems
The first set refers to French administrative units. Continental France is partitioned
into 21 administrative “Re´gions” (RE), depicted on the left of Figure 3, which are them-
selves split into 94 “De´partements” (DE), shown on the left of Figure 4. All such units
are aggregates of municipalities, the finest French spatial division for which data are
available.3
3The French metropolitan area is covered by 36,247 municipalities. The division of France into
de´partements was adopted simultaneously with the first French constitution in 1790, replacing the old
“provinces”, which more or less represented dioceses. However, these latter exhibited significant vari-
ation in tax systems, population and land areas, and the new division aimed to create more “regular”
spatial units under a common central legislation and administration. Their size was chosen so that indi-
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Figure 2: Small zoning systems
341 Employment Areas (EA) 341 Small Rectangles (SR)
It can nonetheless be argued that administrative boundaries do not capture the essence
of economic phenomena that often spill over boundaries, which is one of the reasons
why EAs were created. To circumvent this drawback, some authors, especially geogra-
phers, prefer to work with (often arbitrarily-drawn) grids. The rationale is that, even
if they do not necessarily better match the “true boundaries” of economic phenomena,
grid zoning systems provide a greater degree of homogeneity of spatial units than do
administrative zoning systems.4
3.2 Grid zoning systems
We therefore construct a second set of zoning systems purely based on grid units. We
first enclose France into the smallest possible rectangle. We then divide this rectangle
into smaller equally-sized sub-rectangles (based on longitude and latitude). As France
is not rectangle (and closer to an hexagon, actually), several sub-rectangles which map
onto water are obviously left out. We obtain the final grid by aggregating municipal-
ities according to the sub-rectangle in which they have their centroid. The resulting
viduals from any point in the de´partement could make the round trip by horse to the capital city in no
more than two days, which translated into a radius of 30 to 40 km. Regarding the shape, a lively debate
opposed the defenders of grid zoning against the partisans of keeping alive “the tight links created long
ago by moral standards, customs, production, language and nature”. The former strategy proposed di-
viding France into 80 grid units, but the latter division was finally adopted, which resulted in 83 fairly
homogenous (but not geometrically identical) de´partements, the number of which was later increased to
94. In 1956, de´partements were grouped together into re´gions, in order to lead some policies at a larger
spatial scale.
4Another argument refers to intertemporal comparisons when using fixed grid zoning systems. These
do not change over time, while administrative zones may do so. See ESPON (2006) for an overview of
this issue.
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spatial units are not perfect “rectangles” as their boundaries follow those of real mu-
nicipalities. We choose the size of the sub-rectangles to produce three different zoning
systems analogous to administrative zoning systems: 22 (non-empty) large rectangles
(LR), 91 medium rectangles (MR) and 341 small rectangles (SR). It is worth noting that
the largest zoning systems (LR and MR in Figures 3 and 4) include several rectangles
which are partially truncated due to French national boundaries. The finest grid such as
SR (Figure 2) circumvents this pitfall at the expense of geometry, since the units bound-
aries become increasingly ragged at the very fine scale. Therefore, overtly enlarging or
tightening the units alters both their symmetry and regularity.
Figure 3: Large zoning systems
21 Re´gions (RE) 22 Large Rectangles (LR)
A comparison of the results obtained under respectively RE, DE and EA or LR, MR and
SR gives a flavor of any size distortions. We capture the impact of shape by comparing
the results obtained across zoning systems involving units of similar size (RE to LR, DE
to MR, and EA to SR). While these comparisons tell us whether MAUP distortions exist,
they do not indicate whether the differences in the results are systematic and significant,
however, which is why we propose a third set of zoning systems.
3.3 Partly random zoning systems
Our third set of zoning systems involves arbitrarily-drawn spatial units. We define
a set of 100 different partitions of France, by randomly aggregating the 4,662 French
“Cantons”,5 into zoning systems that have a number of units strictly equivalent to those
of administrative ones (341 units for EA, 94 for DE and 21 for RE): we call these REA,
RDE and RRE respectively. These are constructed using the following algorithm. We
5We use this intermediate grouping of Frenchmunicipalities to reduce the computational timewithout
losing too much spatial variability in the randomization process.
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Figure 4: Medium zoning systems
94 De´partements (DE) 91 Medium Rectangles (MR)
randomly draw one canton, called the seed, within each administrative unit. We then
aggregate each seed to a second canton randomly drawn from those contiguous to it. We
continue with a third canton and so on, until all existing cantons have been drawn. We
run the algorithm 100 times at each scale. Broadly speaking, this procedure produces,
for each scale, a partition of France with jiggling borders.
3.4 Characteristics of zoning systems
Our empirical analysis builds on sectoral time-series data at the municipal level. The
aggregation into the aforementioned larger zoning systems yields a three-dimension
panel of employment, number of plants and wages for 18 years (within the 1976-1996)
period and 99 industries (at the two-digit level for both manufacturing and services).
For 1996, we match this panel to a trade data set for manufactured goods. More details
are provided in Appendix.
As can be seen in Table 1, zoning systems differ sharply in their economic features.
The spatial variation in land area is smaller for small grid units than for employment
areas, a property that does not hold for larger administrative units. This reflects two
opposite effects. On the one hand, grid units are more regular, which reduces the vari-
ance. On the other hand, the share of truncated grid units increases with size, which
increases the variance. The latter effect dominates for medium and large units. A clear
drawback of the grid strategy is that, when units are not small enough, the gains of
reducing the variance of land area cannot be attained due to the irregularity of national
borders. Conversely, this also shows that the French authorities were fairly successful
in designing quite homogenous administrative units.
Regarding the other variables, an important distinction concerns the way in which
information is aggregated. The values of summed information (employment and trade
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Number of units 341 341 94 91 21 22
Land area (km2) Av. 1569.8 1580.4 5733.3 5922.3 25663.4 24496.7
Cv. 0.63 0.35 0.34 0.50 0.43 0.53
Employment (workers) Av. 2012 2019 7300 7541 32678 31193
Cv. 4.6 1.5 12.3 1.7 1.8 1.3
Employment density (workers/km2) Av. 4.6 1.5 12.3 1.7 1.8 1.3
Cv. 8.7 3.1 6.3 1.7 1.8 0.8
Wage Av. 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Cv. 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Inter-area distance (km) Av. 396 421 392 454 402 486
Cv. 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.42
Trade flow (tons×1000) Av. 30.96 35.55 84.03 112.09 778.84 918.56
Cv. 3.1 3.8 3.0 3.1 1.5 1.9
Notes: (i) (EA): employment areas, (SR): small rectangles, (DE): de´partements, (MR):
medium rectangles, (RE): re´gions, (LR): large rectangles. (ii) 1976-1996 average, except
for trade flows (1996 value). (iii) Av. is the mean. Cv is the Coefficient of variation (stan-
dard deviation divided by mean). (iii) No units for wage because detrended and centered
around individual mean.
flows) increase with the size of the units, which is straightforward. By way of contrast,
the overall picture should vary less for averaged information, insofar as boundaries do
not create too many non-random errors. For instance, employment density differs only
little across grid zoning systems, regardless of the size of their units, while it varies
more for administrative units, which reflects that the design of administrative zoning
systems was not based on this variable. The suspicion that the MAUP could therefore
bias density estimations motivates the exercise carried out in Section 5. Average wages
are little affected by zoning system.
Finally, variations across zoning systems are smaller for distance and trade than for
employment density. Note however that distance increases with size and the shift from
administrative to grid units. Therefore, boundaries do seem to affect the measurement
of distance, which seems upward-biased for large-size and grid units. This other source
of potential non-random errors is explored in detail in Sections 5 and 6.
4 Spatial concentration
Before turning to regression analysis, we carry out the most basic exercise in eco-
nomic geography, which consists in measuring the extent of spatial concentration, an
issue widely-covered in the literature. Apart from a small number of continuous ap-
proaches, such as Duranton and Overman (2005), work in this area is based on discrete
zoning systems. While some work has focussed on the comparison of spatial concen-
tration across industries, such as Ellison and Glaeser (1997), only little has assessed the
legitimacy of comparing results across zoning systems that differ in the size and shape
of spatial units. In this section, we compare the variability in concentration due to the
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zoning system with that from different concentration indices.
4.1 Gini indices
We compute the spatial Gini index associated with every administrative and grid
zoning system by industry. We then rank industries by spatial concentration and com-
pute Spearman rank correlations across zoning systems. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 2.
Table 2: Spearman rank correlations of Gini indices (1976-1996 average)
(EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
(EA) 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.95
(SR) 1 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.96
(DE) 1 0.99 0.97 0.97
(MR) 1 0.98 0.98
(RE) 1 0.98
(LR) 1
Note: (EA): employment areas, (SR):
small rectangles, (DE): de´partements,
(MR): medium rectangles, (RE):
re´gions, (LR): large rectangles.
Rank correlations across zoning systems that are similar in size (EA and SR, DE and
MR, and RE and LR) are very high, with values of at least 0.98 (see the sub-diagonal ele-
ments in Table 2). The ranking of industries is therefore virtually unaffected by changes
in the shape of units. Size has a slightly greater effect on concentration. For instance,
the rank correlation between employment areas and re´gions is 0.95, which remains high.
Making shape more homogeneous across scales leads to similar results, with the corre-
lation between small and large rectangle zoning systems being 0.96.
With respect to partly random zoning systems, we restrict ourselves to the year 1996
for computational reasons. Figure 5 plots the average (over 100 runs) of the Gini ob-
tained in each industry, for respectively the REA, RDE and RRE zoning systems. Indus-
tries are ranked by ascending Gini at the REA level (the upper dark points).
Two comments are in order. First, regardless of the industry, the Gini index falls with
aggregation level, the difference being less pronounced at both lower and higher values.
The intuition is that smaller units units havemore areas with no registered employment,
which raises the Gini index mechanically. Second, Figure 5 shows that ranks are not
consistent across zoning systems. For instance, industry hierarchy is not the same for
REA as for RDE and RRE. However, rank correlations remain high, at respectively 0.95
for REA-RRE (on average, over the 10, 000 possible combinations of zoning systems),
0.99 for REA-RDE and 0.97 for RDE-RRE. This further suggests that size matters little.
Moreover, the weak shape-dependency observed for administrative and grid zoning
systems is confirmed by the average industry rank correlations across random zoning
systems at each scale, which are respectively 1, 1, and 0.98 for REA, RDE and RRE.
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Figure 5: The size-dependency of the Gini index
Note: (REA): Random employment areas,
(RDE): Random de´partements, (RE): Random
re´gions.
4.2 Ellison and Glaeser indices
It is well known that the spatial Gini index is contaminated by industry structure.
Given total industry employment, industries with fewer plants will have higher Ginis,
even with random plant location. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) develop a measure of con-
centration that is purged of this plant size effect. Table 3 depicts the Spearman rank
correlations for this index.
Table 3: Spearman correlations for EG indices (1976-1996 average)
(EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
(EA) 1 0.78 0.92 0.81 0.80 0.77
(SR) 1 0.72 0.86 0.84 0.82
(DE) 1 0.81 0.81 0.77
(MR) 1 0.93 0.89
(RE) 1 0.93
(LR) 1
Note: (EA): employment areas, (SR):
small rectangles, (DE): de´partements,
(MR): medium rectangles, (RE):
re´gions, (LR): large rectangles.
The rank correlations are generally lower than those for the Gini indices. Hence,
any distortions due to the MAUP are more pronounced when spatial concentration is
measured via the EG index. In particular, size distortions are clearly aggravated, even
though the rank correlations remain fairly high (0.80 for instance between employment
areas and re´gion).
Further support comes from partly random zoning systems. With respect to shape,
the average rank correlation is 0.99 for both REA and RDE, and 0.88 only for RRE. Re-
garding size, the related correlation is 0.88 for the REA-RDE pair, 0.77 for REA-RRE and
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0.81 for DE-RE. Hence, the EG index, although more sophisticated, is somewhat more
sensitive to the MAUP. Such size effects clearly stand out in Figure 6, which depicts av-
erage (over 100 runs) EG indices for respectively the REA, RDE and RRE zoning systems.
Contrary to the Gini index, the EG index increases with the size of units. Further, ag-
gregation discrepancies are not uniform, being more pronounced in the right-hand tail
of the distribution.
Figure 6: The size-dependency of the EG index
Note: (REA): Random employment areas,
(RDE): Random de´partements, (RE): Random
re´gions.
4.3 Comparison between the Gini and the EG
The success of the EG index over the Gini coefficient lies in its alleviation of con-
centration due to the location of big plants. The crucial question we address here is
whether the zoning system affects the ranking of industries more than does the choice
of the index itself. To answer, we turn to a between-index rank correlation analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 show that the between-index Spearman rank correlations are def-
initely smaller than their within counterparts. Even within each zoning system (the
diagonal elements of Table 4), the rank correlation is 0.77 at best (for the RE zoning
system), with the lowest correlation being 0.52 (EA or SR).
There is considerable evidence that index choice, which we can consider as a specifi-
cation issue, produces greater distortions than the choice of zoning system, in terms of
both size or shape. It should thus be of greater concern than the MAUP.
To further gauge the extent of the bias induced by mis-specification compared to the
MAUP, a detailed look at particular industries is useful. The left-hand side of Figures 7
and 8, shows the concentration patterns in the “Textile” and “Hotels and Restaurants”
industries: 6 it is clear that the Gini index exhibits more concentration at low-scale res-
olutions. Turning to EG estimates (Figures 7 and 8), the reverse pattern holds: concen-
tration now increases with scale. Moreover, the time patterns of concentration are fairly
consistent for a given index, regardless of the scale, while greater differences are found
6The (similar) results for other industries are available upon request .
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Table 4: Spearman rank correlations between Gini and EG indices (1976-1996 average)
EG (EA) EG (SR) EG (DE) EG (MR) EG (RE) EG (LR)
Gini (EA) 0.56 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.63 0.59
Gini (SR) 0.56 0.52 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.61
Gini (DE) 0.60 0.52 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.63
Gini (MR) 0.59 0.54 0.62 0.64 0.69 0.64
Gini (RE) 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.70 0.77 0.71
Gini (LR) 0.64 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.73
Note: (EA): employment areas, (SR): small rectangles, (DE):
de´partements, (MR): medium rectangles, (RE): re´gions, (LR): large
rectangles.
Table 5: Rank correlations between Gini and EG indices (Average over 100 runs)
EG (REA) EG (RDE) EG (RRE)
Gini (REA) 0.56 0.55 0.60
Gini (RDE) 0.61 0.61 0.64
Gini (RRE) 0.65 0.66 0.75
Note: (REA): Random employment ar-
eas, (RDE): Random de´partements, (RRE):
Random re´gions.
between indices. For instance, in Figure 7, the movement in the Gini index suggests
an upwards trend in the textile industry from 1995 onwards, whereas no such trend is
seen in the EG index at medium or large size. By way of contrast, the differences due
to shape (that is, between the dashed and plain curves in Figures 7 and 8) are less pro-
nounced than the differences between indices, and smaller than those between scales.
We cannot therefore reject that size affects the level and, to a lesser extent, the time pat-
tern of spatial concentration. However, the conclusions depend critically on the choice
of the index (Gini or EG). Consequently, thinking about which index is the most rele-
vant is more important than the MAUP: the finding of rising or falling concentration
likely substantially affects the ensuing policy prescriptions.
5 Agglomeration economies
While the MAUP only slightly distorts spatial concentration patterns, it might have
a greater effect on the explanation of the spatial distribution of economic variables. We
therefore now consider the incidence of the MAUP in the context of multivariate regres-
sion analysis. In this section, we focus on the estimation of agglomeration economies.
Evaluating the magnitude of the benefits reaped from spatial proximity is important for
policy, and much work, such as Ciccone and Hall (1996), has been devoted to the esti-
mation of the productivity gains resulting from dense clusters of activities. The benefits
from proximity to large markets and the local composition of labour skills are generally
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Figure 7: Textile Manufacture Industry
Gini index EG index
Notes: (i) EA: employment areas, SR: small rectangles, DE: de´partements, MR: medium rectan-
gles, RE: re´gions, LR: large rectangles.
Figure 8: Hotels and Restaurants
Gini index EG index
Notes: (i) EA: employment areas, SR: small rectangles, DE: de´partements, MR: medium rectan-
gles, RE: re´gions, LR: large rectangles.
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simultaneously estimated.7
We regress local wages, a frequently-used measure of local labor productivity, on
local employment density. Let wat denote the wage in area a at date t, computed as
average earnings of all workers located in a at date t (henceforth the gross wage), and
Denat employment density (per square Km). The benchmark specification we run is the
following:
logwat = α logDenat + γXat + εat, (1)
whereXat is a vector of control variables. We compare the estimated elasticity of wages
to employment density across zoning systems. As above, we then check whether the
choice of zoning systems matters less for the size of agglomeration economies than the
biases from choice of controls in the wage equation, which is a specification issue.
5.1 A simple correlation
It is useful to briefly look at simple gross wage / density correlations to have an
idea of agglomeration economies. Given the panel structure of the data, we estimate
equation (1) with no controls other than time dummies. Table 6 shows the resulting
elasticities.
Table 6: Gross wages and density: simple correlations
Dependent Variable: Log of gross wage
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.071a 0.07a 0.073a 0.05a 0.09a 0.099a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.47 0.24 0.73 0.38 0.76 0.55
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles;
(DE) = de´partements; (MR) =medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions;
(LR) = large rectangles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii)
Standard-errors in brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively.
The elasticity of wages with respect to density is not significantly affected by shape.
In both EA and SR, the value is about 0.07, which lies within the range of [0.04, 0.11]
reported in Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008), drawn from the analysis of US and Eu-
ropean data. Even though some differences result from the move to a larger scale, the
shape effect remains small. Size differences do not really matter when moving from
small to medium units, although larger differences occur as we move to the largest
units. However, this is not necessarily due to the size distortion induced by the MAUP.
At small spatial scales density economies mainly work through technological spillovers
and labor pooling; at larger scales, they are mainly generated by sharing markets for fi-
nal and intermediate goods. Hence, there is no reason why the elasticity of productivity
7See Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008).
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with respect to density should be the same. However, we do not know how much of
the difference reflects real economic phenomena and how much the MAUP.
It is worth noting that the explanatory power of employment density is significantly
lower (almost halved) for the grid than for the administrative units. Therefore, bound-
aries which do not reflect administrative/economic realities do actually generate mea-
surement errors, possibly in both the left-hand and right-hand side variables. However,
the good news is that these errors seem to be largely randomly distributed: even though
density loses explanatory power, the overall picture with respect to elasticity is one of
stability.
As a second step, we compare the two MAUP effects to those resulting from the
inclusion in the wage equation of controls for skills (Section 5.2), and market potential
(Section 5.3).
5.2 Controlling for skills and experience
Our empirical analysis uses rich individual wage information from a large panel
of workers followed across time and jobs. We are hence able to apply a sophisticated
procedure to control for local skills, and to check whether the greater productivity ob-
served in dense areas is partly due to the spatial sorting of workers as suggested by
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008). In a first stage, we calculate local wages net of
individual skills and experience, as follows:
wit = θi + νj(i,t) +Xitβ + it,
where wit is the wage of worker i at date t. This is a function of θi, an individual fixed-
effect capturing the impact of both time-invariant observed and unobserved skills, νj(i,t),
an effect specific to the firm j where i is employed at date t, and Xit a set of controls
for worker’s i experience at date t (age, age-squared, and number of previous jobs in-
teracted with gender). Based on the estimates provided in ?, and following Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), we define a wage net of any individual observed and
unobserved skills and experience effects,
(
wit − θˆi −Xitβˆ
)
. We then compute the aver-
age of this net wage over all individuals living in the same area a, at date t (henceforth
net wage). This yields a measure of local labor productivity purged of individual skills
and experience. We proceed by regressing net wages on employment density. The re-
sults are shown in Table 7.
The elasticity of net wages with respect to employment density is half of that for
gross wages, which is a difference of an order of magnitude greater than that due to
the MAUP. We therefore reach the same conclusion as previously: differences due to
the size and shape of spatial units are small compared to the upward bias induced by
the omission of workers’ skills and experience in the wage equation. Moreover, shape
distortions are even attenuated in many cases (between DE and MR, and RE and LR, for
instance), once these controls are included.
5.3 Market potential as a new control
Not only local density and skill composition affect labor performance, but so does
the proximity to large economic centers outside the area. A major drawback of the
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Table 7: Net wages and density: simple correlations
Dependent Variable: Log of net wages
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.033a 0.028a 0.029a 0.023a 0.048a 0.052a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.62 0.57
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE)
= de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR)
= large rectangles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-
errors in brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels respectively.
abovewage specifications is that there are no controls for the relative position of the area
within the whole economy. For instance, wage equations derived from fully-specified
economic geography models, such as Redding and Venables (2004) and Hanson (2005),
account for spatial proximity via structural demand and supply access variables. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to replicate such a sophisticated and difficult to im-
plement approach. Here we only include, as well as density, a Harris (1954) market
potential variable based on the employment accessible from any given area, divided by
the distance necessary to reach them:8
Market Potential =
∑
a′ 6=a
Ya′
Dista,a′
, (2)
where Ya′ is employment in area a andDista,a′ , the distance between areas a and a′. The
results for gross and net wages are listed in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
Once market potential is accounted for, the impact of density on gross wage is at-
tenuated. Regardless of the zoning system and the wage (gross vs net), the density
coefficients are around 30% lower. The impact of market potential is slightly stronger in
the medium rectangles than for their administrative counterparts, de´partements. This is
consistent with the intuition that cross-boundary discrepancies should be more salient
for grid units that were not designed to minimize them in the first place. Market po-
tential is no longer significant at the regional level, which is consistent with French
re´gions being large enough to depend mainly on themselves (or possibly on foreign
markets, which are not considered here) rather than on each other. Even so, this vari-
able depends on distance which makes it definitely more sensitive to the MAUP than,
for instance, density, as we noted in section 3.4.
Table 9 exhibits striking similarities. Shape has virtually no effect, and size alters
only slightly the results. In addition to the aforementioned larger impact of density
and the smaller impact of market potential for large zoning systems, most differences
are insignificant and are much lower than those from a change in specification. For
8The literature shows that this atheoretic market potential often has the same explanatory power as
structural market potential.
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Table 8: The spatial determinants of gross wages
Dependent Variable: Log of gross wage
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.055a 0.065a 0.059a 0.05a 0.09a 0.098a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Market Potential 0.1a 0.099a 0.062a 0.079a 0.024b -0.009
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.02)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.52 0.26 0.75 0.41 0.77 0.55
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE)
= de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) =
large rectangles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors
in brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
Table 9: The spatial determinants of net wages
Dependent Variable: Log of net wage
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.027a 0.026a 0.021a 0.023a 0.048a 0.052a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Market Potential 0.037a 0.043a 0.036a 0.044a 0.023b -0.0002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.01) (0.012)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.23 0.10 0.35 0.26 0.62 0.57
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE)
= de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) =
large rectangles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors
in brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
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instance, density increases productivity by only 2.7% at the small-unit level, once skills
and market potential are controlled for, while the baseline estimates were over 7%. This
difference supports the findings in the literature (see Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008))
and confirms our conclusion that MAUP is of secondary concern compared to modeling
issues.9
Figure 9 maps out the density and market potential coefficients obtained from the
three partly random zoning systems. For a given size, the dispersion of estimates is
much lower than that induced by a shift of specification, which confirms the absence of
shape effects. The only significant difference due to size regards density in the largest
units. Even so, this almost vanishes in the best specification (net wages), as do the dif-
ferences in the impact of market potential. These conclusions clearly echo the findings
of Amrhein and Flowerdew (1992) and suggest that a good specification is actually an
efficient way to circumvent the MAUP, even when variables do depend on distance.
Figure 9: The size- and shape- dependency of wage determinants
Note: (REA): Random employment areas, (RDE): Random de´partements, (RE): Random
re´gions.
Our previous conclusion regarding the sensitivity of concentration measures is con-
firmed by the analysis of productivity: specification is more important than the MAUP
and, within the MAUP, size matters more than shape, and more so when the model is
mis-specified and variables are distance-dependent.
6 Gravity equations
To test whether distance plays a systematic role in aggravating the distortions due
to MAUP, we turn to the estimation of gravity equations.
9One important concern is not tackled here. In the analysis of how agglomeration enhances perfor-
mance, we inevitably face the major difficulty that causality could run both ways: then worker’s location
is actually determined by wages. However, we leave this issue to one side here, as it has already been
extensively discussed in the literature, and is orthogonal to the MAUP.
18
6.1 Basic gravity
The gravity model has been widely used to investigate the determinants of trade.
A basic specification explains the trade flow Faa′ , originating from area a and shipped
to area a′, by various proxies for the proximity between a and a′. These include the
distance between a and a′, Distaa′ , and a dummy variable stating whether the areas
are contiguous, Contigaa′ . Finally, the famous “border effect” is captured by a dummy
variable for within-area flows, Withina=a′ . As a first step, we estimate the following
two-way fixed-effect specification:
ln (Faa′) = θa + θa′ − ρ ln (Distaa′) + φContigaa′ + ψWithina=a′ + aa′ , (3)
where θa and θ′a are destination and origin fixed effects respectively, and aa′ is an error
term. This fixed-effect approach has the attractive property of being structurally com-
patible with many trade models (based on comparative advantage as well as imperfect
competition).10
Table 10: Basic gravity
Dependent Variable: log of positive flows
(Year 1996)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Distance -1.002a -1.175a -1.604a -1.899a -1.678a -1.996a
(0.022) (0.024) (0.061) (0.048) (0.116) (0.09)
Within 1.810a 1.289a 1.619a 0.804a 1.676a 1.162a
(0.062) (0.06) (0.113) (0.113) (0.155) (0.252)
Contiguity 1.010a 1.128a 1.045a 1.069a 0.768a 0.829a
(0.041) (0.044) (0.063) (0.071) (0.073) (0.086)
Obs. 24849 22189 6600 5069 441 443
R2 0.518 0.545 0.708 0.756 0.941 0.939
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) =
de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large rect-
angles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brackets. (iv)
a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 10 reports the related estimates under both the administrative and grid zoning
systems. The distance elasticity is around 20% larger for grid than for administrative
zoning systems, at a given scale. Contiguity is less affected by shape. Again, size effects
are slightly more salient, especially when moving from the EA-SR to either the DE-MR or
RE-LR zoning systems. Themagnitude of the distance effect (in absolute value) increases
with size (for the administrative and grid zoning systems), as does that of contiguity.
The border effect is always lower for grid zoning systems, which is further evidence of
the economic consistency of administrative units. Measurement errors stemming from
the use of grid zoning systems are less random for trade and proximity variables than
for wage and density. This makes sense as trade and proximity are inherently sensitive
to distance, which is not the case for the other two variables. Moreover, shape and size
systematically bias the measurement of distance, as observed in Section 3.4.
10See Feenstra (2003).
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Figure 10 illustrates the way in which both size and shape affect the values and
standard errors of estimates from partly random zoning systems. Dark dots in the top-
left figure stand for distance (and contiguity and border in the top-right and bottom
figures respectively). The 95% confidence interval is shown by the surrounding lighter
dots. Note that random zoning systems are ranked by increasing estimated values. For
all three proximity measures, we find that the dispersion of estimates increases with
scale, suggesting more shape-dependency in larger zoning systems. Nonetheless, this
dispersion is of lower magnitude than the differences due to moving from one scale to
another (from REA to RDE or RRE, regarding distance and border effects). The shape-
dependency of larger zoning systems (especially RRE) is due to two joint phenomena.
First, coefficient estimation is more likely to suffer from finite-sample bias for larger
(and hence less numerous) units. Second, the random process of aggregation is likely to
produce more distinct zoning systems when data are aggregated into larger units.
Figure 10: The size- and shape-dependency of the impact of spatial proximity on trade
Note: (i) The coefficients (b) have to be greater
(in absolute value) than 1.96 times the standard
error (se) to enter into the 95% confidence in-
terval. (ii) (REA): Random employment areas,
(RDE): Random de´partements, (RE): Random
re´gions.
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Figure 11: The size- and shape-dependency of the trade-creating impact of migrants
Note: (i) The coefficients (b) have to be greater (in absolute value) than 1.96 times the standard
error (se) to enter into the 95% confidence interval. (ii) (REA): Random employment areas,
(RDE): Random de´partements, (RE): Random re´gions.
6.2 Augmented Gravity
Barriers to trade do not only concern proximity. Other trade frictions result from
costs unrelated to distance (such as trade policy, exchange-rate volatility, delivery times,
and inventory or regulation costs), and frommore subtle frictions due to the need to ac-
quire information on remote trading partners or to enforce contracts, as emphasized by
Rauch (2001). To tackle these, the literature extends the basic gravity model by making
trade costs depend not only on spatial proximity but also on cultural and informational
proximity. For instance Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002) report that migration between
two countries enhances their bilateral trade by around 50%. To evaluate the trade-
creating impact of social and business networks within countries, Combes, Lafourcade,
and Mayer (2005) estimate:
ln (Faa′) = θa + θa′ − ρ ln (Distaa′) + φContigaa′ + ψWithina=a′
+α ln (1 +Migaa′) + β ln (1 +Miga′a) + γ ln (1 + Plantaa′) + aa′ , (4)
where Migaa′ is the number of people born in area a′ and working in area a, called
(relative to area a) immigrants, Miga′a are analogously emigrants, and Plantaa′ is the
number of financial connections between plants belonging to the same business group
(see Appendix).
It can readily be seen from Table 11 that, controlling for networks reduces the dis-
tance elasticity by about one-third, whereas the contiguity effect is three to four times
smaller. The border effect is reduced even further, and disappears completely at the RE-
LR scales. These effects are far larger than those due to the two determinants of MAUP,
size and shape.
It is worth noting that the trade-creating effect of migrants, which does not directly
depend on distance, is robust to the shift of zoning system, in terms of both size and
shape. By way of contrast, even though the trade-creating impact of business networks
increases slightly with the scale of administrative units, this is no longer statistically
significant for grid zoning systems. Figure 11 displays the estimated immigrant and
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Table 11: Augmented Gravity
Dependent Variable: log of positive flows
(1996)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Distance -0.628a -0.714a -1.194a -1.285a -1.261a -1.420a
(0.023) (0.028) (0.063) (0.064) (0.118) (0.129)
Within 1.016a 0.691a 0.587a 0.044 0.192 -0.237
(0.065) (0.07) (0.129) (0.127) (0.226) (0.378)
Contiguity 0.321a 0.421a 0.37a 0.335a 0.22a 0.412a
(0.05) (0.051) (0.068) (0.075) (0.081) (0.119)
Immigrants 0.221a 0.217a 0.24a 0.245a 0.309a 0.211b
(0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.034) (0.074) (0.092)
Emigrants 0.232a 0.244a 0.213a 0.274a 0.285a 0.245c
(0.014) (0.015) (0.038) (0.035) (0.108) (0.139)
Plant network 0.063a 0.033b 0.258a 0.035 0.204 0.392c
(0.018) (0.013) (0.08) (0.049) (0.177) (0.204)
Obs. 24561 21606 6600 5059 441 443
R2 0.541 0.574 0.722 0.772 0.954 0.948
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) =
de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large rect-
angles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brackets. (iv)
a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
emigrant coefficients in the same way as in Figure 10. Both groups of estimates mono-
tonically increase with the level of aggregation.
We therefore continue to find that size matters more than shape. Moreover, the mag-
nitude of this distortion is definitely larger than in our previous exercises. The obvious
explanation is that trade equations involve many distance-dependent explanatory vari-
ables. Since the MAUP is fundamentally linked to proximity mis-measurement, it is
fairly intuitive that it jeopardizes the estimation of trade equations more than that of
wage equations, and that it is more salient for market potential within wage equations,
in particular when skill variables are omitted. Specification issues are anyway a more
important concern.
7 Conclusions
The overall picture is fairly clear. The use of different specifications to assess spatial
concentration, agglomeration economies, and trade determinants produces substantial
variation in the estimated coefficients. Inmost cases, theory provides a clear explanation
of such variations, which are much larger than those sparked by the MAUP. Although
size might still be important, especially in the context of distance-dependent explana-
tory variables, it is of second-order compared to specification, while shape is of only
third-order concern. On the other hand, when zoning systems are specifically designed
to address local questions, as is the case for French employment areas, we definitely ar-
gue that they should be used. Those who are left with other administrative units should
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not worry too much, however. We therefore urge researchers to pay the most attention
to choosing the relevant specification for the question they want to tackle.
We do not of course claim that the various specifications used in this paper are ac-
tually the best. They are simply those frequently found in the economic geography
literature. Many other empirical questions can be considered. We focus on three simple
exercises because they are quite different in spirit, and cover a wide range of estima-
tions. This makes us fairly confident that our conclusions are robust to other exercises,
even though this remains to be shown. Finally, note that the French economical and
institutional design may be, by chance, particularly well-designed to minimize MAUP
problems. We therefore encourage researchers to replicate the exercises carried out here
in other contexts (countries and periods).
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Appendix: Data
Economic variables for all zoning systems are obtained by aggregating information
over the 36,247 French municipalities (“communes”).
First, over the 1976-1996 period, the composition in terms of establishments (em-
ployment size, and number of establishments) and workers (year and place of birth,
age, gender, occupation, and wage, among others) is available at the 4-digit industrial
level. The data come from the INSEE survey “De´claration Annuelle de Donne´es Sociales”
(DADS), which collects matched employer-employee information in France. Our anal-
ysis builds on a panel extract covering people born in October of all even-numbered
years, excluding civil servants, which is a representative 1/24th of the French popula-
tion. No survey was carried out in 1981, 1983 or 1990, producing a final sample of over
12.3 million plant-individual year observations, which are then re-aggregated by spatial
unit, year (18 points), and industry (99 two-digit sectors covering both manufacturing
and services).11 As the key parameter of the sampling process is the date of birth, there
is no obvious reason to believe that the sample is geographically biased.
For 1996, the above data arematchedwith information on the trade volumes shipped
by road, both within and between municipalities, which we aggregate into different
larger zoning systems. The data comes from the French Ministry of Transport, which
annually surveys a stratified random sample of trucks.
Regarding social and business networks, we compute migrant stocks based on the
number of natives from one area who moved to work in another area.12 Business net-
works are captured via the number of financial connections between plants belonging
to the same business group. For each business group, we count the number of plants
located in each area. We then compute for each pair of areas the sum over all business
groups of the product of the two counts. The data source here is the INSEE survey
“LIaisons FInancie`res” (LIFI), which defines a business group as the set of all firms con-
trolled either directly or indirectly (over 50%) by the same parent firm, which is itself
not controlled by any other firm.13
Bilateral distances between spatial units are computed as the average of the great-
circle distances between their municipalities, weighted by total employment.
11As in Abowd, Kramarz, and Roux (2006), part-timers are retained and outliers (over five standard
errors above and below the mean) are dropped. The selection of industries and the removal of sampling
errors at the smallest scale follows Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008).
12This figure is also calculated using the DADS survey.
13See Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) for more details on the network variables.
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